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THE NATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF LIABILITY
REFORMS FOR GENERAL LIABILITY AND
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
W Kip Viscusi*
Patricia Born**
I. INTRODUCTION
The mid-1980s marked the emergence of the liability crisis. By
most any standard, there was a rapid jump in the role of the tort
liability system concentrated in a narrow time band from 1984-86.
The number of personal injury products liability cases commenced
in the federal courts was 6876 in 1980, and had risen slightly to
7677 by 1984.1 By 1985, however, this number jumped to 12,507,
and it continued to rise to a peak of 16,166 in 1988. Measured as a
percentage of all federal civil cases, the role of liability also grew,
rising from under three percent of all cases in 1984 to five percent
in 1985.2 Thus, the increasing role of liability was not simply due
to the increasing litigiousness of society, but rather, it also reflected
a changing mix in the nature of the lawsuits. While much of the
surge in liability was due to the rising role of asbestos cases, other
liability suits also increased during the mid-1980s. 3 Once the influ-
ence of asbestos cases is excluded, however, the liability suit trend
is much more stable.
The tally of liability suits in the federal courts is but one mea-
sure of the shifting liability burden. Case counts do not track
which parties prevail in these suits or the amount of the awards.
More importantly, they also neglect the role of out-of-court settle-
ments, the dominant source of compensation for accident victims.
A more comprehensive measure of the role of tort liability is the
shifting level of premiums firms pay for liability insurance cover-
age. In the case of general liability insurance, these premiums rose
* George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Duke University. A.B. 1971, Harvard
College; M.P.P. 1973, A.M. 1974, Ph.D. 1976, Harvard College.
** Research Economist, American Medical Association. A.B. 1986, University of
Michigan; MA 1991, Ph.D. 1994, Duke University.
1 These data are based on information from W. KP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LIABILrry 17 (1991). See also W. Kip Viscusi, The Performance of Liability Insurance in
States with Different Products-Liability Statutes, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 809 (1990).
2 See Viscusi, supra note 1, at 18.
3 Id. at 21-24.
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from $6.5 billion in 1984, to $11.5 billion in 1985, and then to
$19.4 billion in 1986, tripling the premium level in a two-year pe-
riod.4 A similar pattern was evidenced in the case of medical mal-
practice insurance, where premiums doubled in the same two-year
period, from $2.4 billion in 1984, to $3.5 billion in 1985, and then
to $4.5 billion in 1986.1 This surge in premium levels was not nec-
essarily profitable for insurance firms. Indeed, there is substantial
evidence discussed below indicating that writing insurance became
a losing proposition during that period, accounting for the effort
by insurance companies to raise premium amounts to cover their
losses. In addition, there was evidence of insurance market distor-
tions as some firms were denied insurance coverage. For instance,
the Coney Island Cyclone ride was closed temporarily; municipal
parks closed playgrounds; motels removed diving boards from
their swimming pools; the private aircraft industry in the United
States virtually shut down altogether; almost all firms abandoned
the production of vaccines; and U.S. contraceptive research
grounded to a halt.6
Many of the changes in the role of tort liability can be attrib-
uted to changes in the structure of tort liability law over the past
three decades. The emergence of strict liability, the rising role of
design defect cases and, perhaps most importantly, the emergence
of mass toxic tort cases, greatly expanded the scope of liability.
Moreover, there became the widespread perception that juries
were awarding plaintiffs excessive amounts that were not justified
by the character of the injury.
The main market manifestation of the liability crisis was its in-
fluence on liability insurance markets. Liability insurance is the
market context where one would expect the shifting role of tort
liability to be most apparent because it is in this market that firms
obtain coverage for their liability insurance costs.7 Indeed, much
of the impetus for the tort liability reform efforts came from a per-
ception that the insurance markets were in a state of crisis during
this period.
4 Id. at 27.
5 These data were calculated from the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) annual data tapes.
6 For a review of these events, see Viscusi, supra note 1, chs. 1-2.
7 Another market context in which the shifting role of tort liability is apparent is
medical services. The frequency of medical malpractice claims rose at a rate of 10%
per year from 1975 to 1986, threatening to disrupt the provision of medical services.
See Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the Other Side Greener, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter
TORT LAw].
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In this Article, we will examine the changing performance of
insurance markets for both general liability insurance and medical
malpractice insurance throughout the 1984-91 period. These are
the two lines of insurance primarily affected by the liability crisis.
Conventional insurance coverage for homeowners' insurance, au-
tomobile insurance, and other lines performed in a much more
stable manner throughout that period' and were not as subject to
the changing role of tort liability in American society. Examining
the performance of insurance markets, as opposed to changing liti-
gation patterns, is also instructive because it enables us to capture
the full effect of the changing liability burden. Insurance costs will
reflect not only federal court cases and their associated verdicts,
but state court cases as well. Moreover, out-of-court settlements,
which are over fifty times more likely than court verdicts for plain-
tiffs, will also be captured by examining the shifting insurance bur-
den.' The data set we analyze will include all firms writing
insurance coverage in the United States, utilizing the information
that insurance companies are required to provide to the states as
part of the insurance regulation process.
To assess the shifting performance of the liability insurance
market, we will examine the changing profitability of insurance.
The principal measure examined will be the ratio of insurance
losses to insurance premiums, which provides an index of the rela-
tive profitability of the underwriting activities in a particular line of
insurance. This measure is the focal point of the literature on in-
surance regulation. 10
In the course of this assessment, we will investigate which
states enacted reforms from 1985 to 1987, and how these reforms
related to insurance market characteristics. Did the character of
insurance market operations contribute to the adoption of tort lia-
8 Auto insurance premiums rose 30% from 1984 to 1986, while homeowners in-
surance premiums rose just 13% in the same period. These figures are based on data
from the NAIC annual data tapes.
9 The relative ratio of out-of-court settlements to court verdicts won by plaintiffs is
based on the data in Viscusi, supra note 1, at 46.
10 See, e.g., Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation:
Assessing Our Control of Risks, in TORT LAW, supra note 7, at 272; David J. Cummins &
Scott E. Harrington, The Impact of Rate Regulation in U.S. Pmperty-Liability Insurance Mar-
kets: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of Individual Firm Loss Ratios, 12 GENEVA PAPERS ON RSK &
INS. 42, 50-62 (1987); Henry Grabowski et al., Price Availability Tradeoffs of Automobile
Insurance Regulation, 56J. RISK & INS. 275 (1989); Scott E. Harrington, The Impact of
Rate Regulation on Prices and Undeiting Results in the Property-Liability Insurance Indus-
try, 51 J. RiSK & INS. 577 (1984); Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, Insurance Market
Responses to the 1980s Liability Reforms: An Analysis of Firm-Level Data, 61J. RISK & INS.
(forthcoming June 1994).
17451994]
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1745 1993-1994
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
bility reforms and the timing of this adoption? The greatest eco-
nomic pressures for tort liability reform should come from the
states that have been hardest hit by these liability crises. Did these
states react faster than those with a more stable liability environ-
ment, or was the adoption of liability reforms simply attributable to
political factors independent of interstate differences in insurance
market operations?
Perhaps most importantly, what effect did the liability reforms
have? The first yardstick used to assess this impact will be the ex-
tent that these reforms influence insurance market trends. In the
course of this assessment, we will investigate a variety of different
measures of insurance market profitability pertaining to the mean
profitability, the median profitability, and the profitability at the
seventy-fifth percentile of the profitability distribution. This assess-
ment will not only make it possible to assess whether liability re-
forms affected the trend, but also how firms at different levels of
profitability were affected differently by the liability reforms. To
the extent that the state liability reform efforts were targeted at the
excesses of the tort liability system, one should expect the firms
experiencing catastrophic losses to benefit most from the liability
reforms, resulting in an unequal distribution of the influence of
tort liability on the insurance market.
A second basis of comparison used to assess the influence of
liability reforms will be to contrast the insurance market patterns in
the states adopting liability reforms with those states not imple-
menting reforms during that period. One might view the no-re-
form states as providing an index of how insurance markets might
have recovered from the liability insurance crisis even in the ab-
sence of tort liability reform. Did the states adopting reforms stabi-
lize the insurance profitability more rapidly than the states not
adopting the reforms, as one would expect if these reforms were
effective?
We will also examine the effect of these reforms over a long
period of time extending through 1991. Liability reforms should
be expected to increase the profitability of firms operating in the
states adopting these reforms. If these reforms make writing insur-
ance more profitable in the reform state than in the no-reform
state, however, firms should shift their operations to engage in
price competition in the profitable reform states and possibly de-
crease their operations in the less profitable no-reform states."
11 See PaulJoskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the Property-Liability Insurance
Industry, 4 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMr. Sci. 375 (1973); Mark Pauly et al., Regulation and
1746 [Vol. 24:1743
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The long run effect should be that rates of profitability should be
equalized across the reform and no-reform states if insurance mar-
kets are truly competitive, ultimately passing gains from tort liabil-
ity reform on to consumers. To what extent was there such an
equalization in profitability through the 1991 period?
The final class of concerns will pertain to the nature of the
scope of our investigation. By considering both medical malprac-
tice and general liability coverage, it will be possible to compare
the role of the liability reforms in these two different contexts.
Were medical malpractice reforms more prevalent than general lia-
bility reforms? To what extent was there an overlap between the
states adopting the two kinds of reforms? Did these reforms have
comparable effects, or was one class of reforms much more effec-
tive? Examining the insurance market profitability statistics for
each of these two markets will illuminate comparative questions
such as these, as well as help determine whether the reforms them-
selves were influential.
II. LIABILITY TRENDS
The insurance data sample we use for our analysis of the effect
of the liability reforms on insurance profitability will be the data
from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC). Each state regulates insurance, and one requirement of
this regulation is that all firms writing coverage in the different
lines must submit the pertinent financial information to the state
regulators. This information is available on a firm-specific basis by
state, and by line of coverage, making it possible to analyze the
overall trends in the insurance market as well as state differences in
these trends.1 2
To track the performance in a typical market, one would like
to know three things. First, what is the price at which the good is
being sold? Second, how much of the good is being sold? Third,
what is the resulting profitability of the firms producing the good?
In the case of liability insurance data, firms do not report the price
and quantity of insurance sold. Information is available on pre-
mium levels, but it is not possible to distinguish whether any shift
in premiums is due to a change in the price of insurance or a
Quality Competition in the U.S. Insurance Industry, in THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE REG-
ULATION 107 (J6rg Finsinger & Mark Pauly eds., 1986).
12 More specifically, the data set that we used was culled from 56 computer tapes
provided to us by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Data drawn
from these tapes were then used in the accompanying empirical analysis.
1994] 1747
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change in the amount of insurance being bought. As a result, the
insurance literature focuses on an index of the profitability of in-
surance as the principal barometer of how insurance markets are
performing.
This profitability measure, known as the "loss ratio," is the ra-
tio of losses firms incur for the policies they have written in a par-
ticular year to the value of premiums on these policies.13 If the
losses equal premiums, then the firm has broken even from an un-
derwriting standpoint. If losses exceed premiums, resulting in a
loss ratio greater than 1.0, firms are losing money on their under-
writing activities. Finally, if losses are below premiums, then the
firms are making an underwriting profit. Because premiums can
be invested, writing insurance may still be profitable even in situa-
tions in which the loss ratio falls below 1.0.14 Consequently, one
should be cautious in making inferences that the insurance indus-
try is losing money when the loss ratio rises above 1.0." However,
the profitability of its underwriting activities does decrease as loss
ratios increase. As a consequence, researchers have focused on the
loss ratio as the dominant measure of insurance market
performance.
Figure 1 sketches the loss ratio trends for the time period ana-
lyzed, where these loss ratios are weighted by the level of insurer
activities. In particular, the loss ratios of firms writing a larger vol-
ume of premiums are given a greater weight proportional to their
premium level. This adjustment avoids the distorting effect that
would otherwise occur if small and unprofitable firms were given
equal weight.
The role of insurance market conditions in providing an impe-
tus for the liability reform movement is apparent from these
figures. Loss ratios exceeded 1.0 in 1984, as they were 1.08 for gen-
eral liability coverage. A similar pattern is shown in Figure 2 for
medical malpractice insurance, where the loss ratio was 1.12 in
1984. In 1985, which is the principal year of the liability reforms,
loss ratios hit an all-time high at 1.17 for general liability coverage
in 1985 and 1.20 for medical malpractice coverage in 1985.
Two implications follow from this trend, which will be bol-
13 See Charles L. McClenahan, Ratemaking, in FOUNDATIONS OF CASUALIry ACTUA-
RIAL SCIENCE 25 (Casualty Actuarial Society 1990).
14 William B. Fairley, Investment Income and Profit Margins in Poperty-Liability Insur-
ance: Theory and Empirical Results, 10 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 192 (1979).
15 In fact, the property and casualty insurance industry as a whole has been operat-
ing at an underwriting loss for the entire period of 1984 to 1991. Underwriting losses
were calculated from the NAIC annual data tapes.
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stered by the more detailed analysis below. First, the loss ratio in-
crease and the associated drop in insurance profitability were
principal factors leading to the adoption of the tort liability re-
forms. Indeed, "tort liability reforms" has become almost synony-
mous with "cost containment." As a general rule, recent legislative
changes designated as liability reforms do not increase the
probability that the plaintiff will prevail or increase the size of the
damages that the plaintiff will receive. The second implication of
these loss ratio trends is that the precipitous drop in the loss ratios
following 1985 is suggestive of a possible influence of the tort liabil-
ity reforms on insurer profitability. If the objective of the liability
reforms was to enhance insurance profitability, then at least judg-
ing from the overall market performance, this objective seems to
have been fulfilled.
There may of course have been other contributing factors.16
The more detailed analysis below will examine states adopting re-
forms and states that did not, and assess the character of the shifts
that took place in these different states. However, it also may be
the case that there was a general shift in the tort liability climate
beginning in the mid-1980s. The widespread publicity given to
supposed excesses of the tort liability system may have shifted the
liability climate even in the states not adopting explicit legislative
reforms. Consequently, judges and juries may have become more
pro-defendant in their rulings. While exploring these possibilities,
using data on insurance market behavior is not possible, but never-
theless, one should not rule out the potential role of factors other
than specific legislative reforms.
The improvement in insurance underwriting profitability
came quickly after the mid-1980s and was maintained until 1991.
General liability loss ratios dropped to 0.79 in 1986, and were only
slightly higher at 0.81 in 1991. Similarly, medical malpractice loss
ratios dropped to 0.99 in 1986, continued to fall through 1989, and
eventually rose to 0.74 in 1991. In the case of each line of insur-
ance, there has been a dramatic shift in the profitability of insur-
ance in the post-liability reform era. In the sections below, we will
examine the behavior in the different states that undertook these
liability reforms in order to assess the degree to which these trends
are consistent with the reform effect.
16 See Cummins & Harrington, supra note 10 (discussing a number of factors that
can be expected to influence individual insurer loss ratios, including ownership form,
distribution method, investment yield, and market concentration).
1994] 1751
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III. GENERAL LIABILITY REFORMS
General liability insurance coverage includes product liability
for coverage of consumer products, such as the highly litigated
pharmaceutical products, automobiles, asbestos, and related prod-
ucts that have been the target of liability suits. In addition, acci-
dents occurring on the premises of establishments, such as injuries
at amusement parks and at motel swimming pools, are also in-
cluded within general liability coverage. The anecdotal evidence at
the time of the tort liability crisis of the mid-1980s flagged general
liability coverage as a line of insurance that was being particularly
hard hit.
Partly in response to these pressures, states enacted a wide va-
riety of reform efforts designed principally to limit liability costs.1 7
These measures were quite diverse, including restrictions on joint
and several liability, limits on punitive damages, abolition of collat-
eral source rules, provision for payment of court costs for frivolous
suits, limits on non-economic damages, limits on liability, limits on
attorney fees, and similar measures. Unfortunately, many of these
actions were typically undertaken as part of a larger package of re-
forms. Thus, states did not enact restrictions on pain and suffering
in 1985, dram shop liability rules in 1986, and punitive damage
restrictions in 1987. If they had, an examination of the shifting
trends in the performance of liability insurance and the incremen-
tal effect of the reforms would be possible as each of these succes-
sive experiments with liability reforms was undertaken. Instead,
our task is to assess the influence of entire packages of reforms,
where a possible implication of this legislative reform goes beyond
the specifics of the reform action and may reflect a change in the
liability climate within the state.
Table 1 lists the different reform efforts undertaken for gen-
eral liability over the 1985-87 period in which reforms were en-
acted.18 All but four states enacted reforms during this time
period. The initial wave of reform in 1985 included twelve states;
17 See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE PoLrCAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF
INSURANCE (1988) (discussing the reform coalitions and their proposals). In most
states, coalitions of insurance companies, physicians, municipalities, day-care centers,
small businesses, and truckers faced opposition from the American Trial Lawyers As-
sociation and consumer groups that occasionally contained labor unions. In some
states, adoption of liability reforms was accompanied by requirements that insurers
reduce premiums (Florida) or set prices in accordance with specified zones (New
York).
18 Reform efforts targeted at the general liability insurers were obtained from the
Alliance of American Insurers, Civil Justice Enactments, 1985-1987.
1752 [Vol. 24:1743
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twenty-two states followed suit in 1986, and a final group of twelve
states adopted reforms in 1987. The adoption of the reforms was
not an entirely random process. Although political factors, such as
the composition of the state legislature, are no doubt instrumental,
the differing tort liability climate in these states will also be shown
to be consequential.
Table 1
Summary of Reform Efforts, 1985-1987
General Liability
Reformed in
1986
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New York
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Utah
Washington
West Virginia
Reformed in
1987
Idaho
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Texas
Vermont
Virginia
No Reforms
Arkansas
Kentucky
North Carolina
Pennsylvania
Table 2 presents the trends in the mean loss ratios for general
liability insurance for each of the four groups of states listed, where
states are grouped by the year their reform was enacted, if at all. In
1984, which was the year preceding the reform effort, the loss ra-
tios were above 1.0 in every case. It is noteworthy that the highest
1984 loss ratio in this table is for the states enacting reforms in
1985. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the un-
profitability of insurance in 1984 provided the impetus for the
states adopting reforms in 1985.
Reformed in
1985
Colorado
Illinois
Louisiana
Maine
Massachusetts
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
New Mexico
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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Table 2
Mean Loss Ratios in General Liability Insurance, 1984-1991
(standard errors in parentheses)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
No Reform 1.022 1.115 0.735 0.653 0.650 0.671 0.640 0.695
Effort (0.082) (0.126) (0.047) (0.173) (0.097) (0.035) (0.084) (0.081)
Reformed 1.173 1.106 0.753 0.713 0.682 0.814 0.736 0.867
in 1985 (0.065) (0.340) (0.110) (0.185) (0.142) (0.221) (0.992) (0.087)
Reformed 1.070 1.216 0.817 0.784 0.711 0.805 0.783 0.794
in 1986 (0.049) (0.066) (0.082) (0.136) (0.200) (0.063) (0.180) (0.040)
Reformed 1.016 1.137 0.801 0.773 0.701 0.922 0.804 0.817
in 1987 (0.247) (0.089) (0.424) (0.407) (0.247) (0.083) (0.123) (0.081)
Somewhat strikingly, we observe the same pattern in the next
year as well. The highest loss ratio in the 1985 column is for the
states adopting reforms in 1986. Once again, the very high degree
of unprofitability of insurance in some states in 1985 seems to have
provided an impetus for reforms in those states in the following
year.
The lowest loss ratio in 1985 was for the states undertaking
reforms in that year, so that within a single-year period the states
reforming in 1985 went from having the highest loss ratio average
in 1984 to the lowest loss ratio average in 1985. Moreover, whereas
the loss ratios for every other state group in Table 2 rose in 1985,
the loss ratio declined for the states enacting reforms in 1985. As a
result, there seems to have been a distinct shift in the trend of in-
surance profitability resulting from the enactment of the 1985 re-
forms in that group of states.
Lower loss ratios occurred in 1986, in addition to increasing
profitability for all of the groups listed in Table 2. Unlike the re-
sults for the 1985 and 1986 reforms, for the year preceding the
1987 reforms, the states undertaking the reforms did not have the
highest loss ratios. However, their loss ratio average of 0.80 in 1986
is the second highest of all the groups in 1986, and is only barely
exceeded (by 0.02) by the loss ratio average for the states re-
forming in 1986. Perhaps another reason for the absence of such a
stark pre-reform discrepancy is that, by 1986, the insurance mar-
kets had begun to stabilize more generally, so that the excesses ap-
parent in 1984 and 1985 were not evident.
The overall trend in liability market performance over the
1984-91 period was one of substantial improvements in the mean
profitability of all the lines of insurance. States not adopting re-
forms experienced a loss ratio decline of 1.12 to 0.70. States adopt-
1754 [Vol. 24:1743
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ing reforms in 1985 experienced a loss ratio decline of 1.17 to 0.87.
States adopting reforms in 1986 experienced a loss ratio decline of
1.07 in 1984 to 0.79 in 1991, and states adopting reforms in 1987
experienced a loss ratio drop of 1.02 in 1984 to 0.82 in 1991.
These comparisons are not as refined as some of the comparisons
undertaken below because the year immediately preceding the re-
form was not always 1984, and the starting point from which the
reforms had to take effect differed. State reform efforts should be
given credit for the overall shift in the profitability of liability insur-
ance beginning with the year just before the reform, and not the
entire change since 1984. Even with these caveats, however, it is
clear that the profitability of all lines of insurance seems to have
improved. The main effect of the liability reforms appears to have
been an acceleration of the pace of improved profitability in the
states adopting reforms, as opposed to making these states more
profitable for insurance companies in the post-reform era.
Results such as this would not be a great surprise to those be-
lieving the insurance market is competitive. If tort liability reforms
improve the profitability of writing insurance in a particular state,
other firms should enter those states to drive the profitability
down, equalizing the profitability of writing additional coverage in
different states. Put somewhat differently, the decreased costs to
insurance companies resulting from tort liability reforms ultimately
should be passed on to insurance purchasers so that one would not
expect there to be a higher level of profitability of firms in states
adopting the liability reforms in the long run.
Although the average loss ratio statistics are instructive, they
may be potentially distorted by the influence of outliers. Firms
with particularly bad loss experiences, which, for example, might
be the case for firms that were insurers in mass toxic tort lawsuits,
would be expected to be particularly hard hit.'9 The role of these
outliers could potentially distort the mean of the trends in the
profitability of insurance.
Table 3 presents information on the median loss ratios for the
different insurer groups, as well as information on the seventy-fifth
percentile of the loss ratio distribution. Firms at the seventy-fifth
percentile will have a loss ratio higher than seventy-five percent of
the remaining firms in the group. One would expect these outliers
to be most affected by limits on liability and reforms such as dam-
ages caps. The liability reform efforts were intended to curb the
19 In 1985, asbestos-related claims were being filed at a rate of 500 per month and
court judgments had exceeded one billion dollars. See MEIER, supra note 17, at 94.
17551994]
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purported excesses of the liability system, rather than simply de-
crease the expected awards to all plaintiffs, irrespective of the mer-
its of the case. 20 To the extent that reforms are targeted in this
manner, it is the seventy-fifth percentile that should manifest the
greatest influence.
Table 3
State Loss Ratios at the Median and 75th Percentile, 1984-1991
General Liability
States with no Reform Efforts
States that Reformed in 1985
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.678 0.656 0.518 0.546 0.503 0.520 0.495 0.536
75th 1.504 1.500 1.035 1.032 1.026 1.090 1.043 1.135
Percentile
States that Reformed in 1986
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.689 0.644 0.520 0.514 0.505 0.497 0.475 0.527
75th 1.490 1.369 1.032 0.997 1.013 1.060 0.990 1.163
Percentile
States that Reformed in 1987
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.618 0.601 0.485 0.501 0.500 0.508 0.470 0.526
75th 1.334 1.312 0.953 0.985 0.989 1.028 1.015 1.135
Percentile
The trend in the median loss ratios follows a pattern very simi-
lar to that displayed by the means. States adopting reforms in 1985
experienced improved profitability both in that year and in 1986.
States adopting reforms in 1986 experienced improved profitability
beginning in that year. The principal exception is the median loss
20 Penalties for frivolous suits, liability limits, the establishment of immunities, and
alternative dispute mechanisms were measures aimed at reducing the number of
cases brought to trial.
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ratio pattern for states adopting reforms in 1987, which exhibited a
loss ratio rise in that year.
The most striking patterns in Table 3 pertain to the outliers.
The shifting trends in the seventy-fifth percentile of the loss ratio
distribution presumably should more accurately reflect the influ-
ence of the tort liability reforms. The seventy-fifth percentile for
the no-reform states was comparatively stable over the 1984 to 1991
period, declining from 1.19 to 1.00. By contrast, the seventy-fifth
percentile for states adopting reforms in 1985 dropped from 1.50
in 1984 to 1.14 in 1991; states adopting reforms in 1986 exper-
ienced a loss ratio decline over that period of 1.49 to 1.16; states
adopting reforms in 1987 experienced a loss ratio drop of 1.33 to
1.14. Only the 1987 reform states experienced a loss ratio improve-
ment comparable to the no-reform states. In the case of the 1985
and 1986 reforms, there was a much more substantial effect. One
would have expected this to be the case because states with the
most pressing liability problems should have enacted tort liability
reforms first. Indeed, this was evidenced in the high mean loss
ratio values found above in the years preceding the adoption of the
liability reforms in the different states. The shifting trends in the
performance of the seventy-fifth percentiles of these distributions
reflect the greater impact of the initial liability reform efforts as
compared with those undertaken in the late-1980s.
A final set of instructive comparisons is the calculation of the
loss ratio differences between the performance of the insurance
market in a particular year relative to the year immediately preced-
ing reform.2 1 In the case of states adopting reforms in 1985, the
issue is how much the loss ratio shifted in 1985 and thereafter as
compared with 1984. The results for the median and seventy-fifth
percentile of the loss ratio distribution presented in Table 4 indi-
cate that there was a very modest effect in 1985, but a considerable
one in 1986 and thereafter. Moreover, it is particularly striking
that the effect relative to 1984 is much greater for the seventy-fifth
21 This "natural experiment" approach uses loss ratio differences to net out line-
specific trends in general liability insurance. The comparison of differences across
states that reformed and states that did not reform is a "differences-in-differences"
analysis of the effects of reforms. For more examples of natural experiments, see
CHENG HSIAO, ANALYSIS OF PANEL DATA (1986); BRUCE D. MEYER ET AL., WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND INJURY DURATION: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL EXPERIMENT (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3494, 1990); T.W. Anderson
& Cheng Hsiao, Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models Using Panel Data, 18 J.
ECONOMETRICS 47 (1982);Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Does Compulsory School
Attendance Affect Schooling and Earnings?, 106 QUARTERLYJ. ECON. 979 (1991).
1994] 1757
HeinOnline  -- 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1757 1993-1994
SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1743
percentile of the distribution, as compared with the effects for the
median.
Table 4
Loss Ratio Differences: General Liability
Reformed in 1985 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1985
No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1986 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1986
Quantile
Median
75th Percentile
1986-1985 1987-1985 1988-1985 1989-1985 1990-1985
-0.125 -0.130 -0.139 -0.147 -0.169
-0.343 -0.358 -0.363 -0.319 -0.392
No Reform Efforts
Quantile
Median
75th Percentile
1986-1985 1987-1985
-0.085 -0.066
-0.354 -0.345
1988-1985
-0.098
-0.314
1989-1985
-0.108
-0.293
1990-1985
-0.124
-0.390
1991-1985
-0.106
-0.271
Reformed in 1987 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1987
Quantile 1987-1986 1988-1986 1989-1986 1990-1986 1991-1986
Median 0.016 0.015 0.023 -0.015 0.041
75th Percentile 0.032 0.036 0.075 0.061 0.182
No Reform Efforts
1758
1991-1985
-0.117
-0.209
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Even if one uses the no-reform states as a reference point,
which may understate the effect of liability reforms to the extent
that ihe reforms undertaken in the reform states had a spillover
effect in altering the liability climate in the no-reform states, one
nevertheless finds that, relative to these states, the 1985 reform ef-
forts were influential. Although the median loss ratio trends are
fairly similar in the two groups of states, the shift from 1984 for the
seventy-fifth percentile is much greater for the reform states than
the no-reform states. By this measure as well, the 1985 reforms ap-
pear to have been particularly influential.
Results in Table 4 for the 1986 reforms suggest a more limited
effect of the 1986 reforms as compared with the 1985 reforms. The
1986 liability reforms' impact upon the median of the loss ratio
distribution is consistently greater than in the no-reform states, as
are the seventy-fifth percentile results beginning in 1987. Never-
theless, these influences are not as great as those exemplified by
the 1985 reform efforts, which seem to have the greatest impact on
insurance market performance. This overall pattern of a diminish-
ing effect of subsequent reforms is borne out as well by the pattern
displayed by the 1987 reforms in Table 4, as the median and sev-
enty-fifth percentile for this group changed only modestly from the
pre-reform period, where the magnitudes of these changes did not
differ from the no-reform states. Given the diminishing impact of
the general liability reforms, it is not surprising that the wave of the
tort liability reform efforts during our sample period came to an
end in 1987.
IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORMS
Medical malpractice reforms in the 1985-87 period were as
prevalent as the reforms of general liability. Moreover, the timing
of the reforms of medical malpractice was somewhat earlier than
that of general liability. As the state reform summary in Table 5
indicates, seventeen states adopted medical malpractice reforms in
1985, compared with twelve states adopting general liability re-
forms.2 An additional twenty-one states filed suit with liability re-
forms in 1986, where this figure is comparable to the twenty-two
state total for general liability. An additional eight states adopted
medical malpractice reforms in 1987, which is below the twelve
22 Reform efforts specifically targeted toward medical malpractice insurance were
obtained from the Alliance of American Insurers. The set of measures is not identical
to the general liability measures because some reforms were specifically aimed at
medical malpractice.
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state figure of states adopting general liability reforms at the end of
this reform era. As in the case of general liability reforms, four
states did not adopt liability reforms.
There is a remarkable similarity in the reform patterns and a
substantial overlap in the states adopting general liability reforms
in a particular year and the states adopting medical malpractice
reforms. In the case of the four states not adopting reforms,
for example, Arkansas and Kentucky are represented in each case.
Table 5
Summary of Reform Efforts, 1985-1987
Medical Malpractice
Reformed in Reformed in Reformed in No Reforms
1985 1986 1987
Arizona Alabama Idaho Arkansas
Colorado Alaska Nebraska Kentucky
Connecticut California North Carolina Mississippi
Florida Delaware North Dakota Vermont
Illinois Georgia Ohio
Kansas Hawaii Oregon
Louisiana Indiana South Carolina
Montana Iowa Virginia
Nevada Maine
New Jersey Maryland
New Mexico Massachusetts
New York Michigan
Pennsylvania Minnesota
South Dakota Missouri
Texas New Hampshire
Utah Oklahoma
West Virginia Rhode Island
Tennessee
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Mississippi and Vermont, the two other no-reform medical malprac-
tice states, were among the last states adopting general liability re-
forms, doing so in 1987. North Carolina and Pennsylvania were no-
reform states for general liability, where North Carolina adopted med-
ical malpractice reforms in 1987, and Pennsylvania did so in 1985.
The substantive content of the medical malpractice liability re-
forms was similar to that of general liability. In each case, the reform
efforts included provisions pertaining to joint and several liability, pu-
nitive damages, collateral sources, frivolous suits, noneconomic dam-
ages, limits on liability, attorney fees, and statutes of limitations. The
distinctive difference is that medical malpractice reforms also in-
cluded specific medical malpractice liability limits, and general liabil-
ity reforms included dram shop provisions.
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The pattern of the mean loss ratios for medical malpractice insur-
ance in the different states, which is summarized in Table 6, is consis-
tent with the timing of the reform efforts. The patterns in 1984 are
particularly striking. The highest loss ratio average is for the states
that undertook reforms in 1985, where this level is followed by the
mean value for the states that undertook reforms in 1986, and states
that reformed in 1987. The lowest mean loss ratio, which is 0.47 be-
low that for the states that undertook reforms in 1985, is for the no-
reform states. The loss ratio value in 1984 is consequently a very good
predictor of whether the state would undertake a medical malpractice
reform, as well as the timing of the reform effort.
Table 6
Mean Loss Ratios in Medical Malpractice Insurance
(standard errors in parentheses)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
No Reform 0.796 0.963 0.988 0.613 0.654 0.546 0.536 0.602
Effort (0.080) (0.263) (5.393) (0.123) (0.090) (0.066) (6.090) (0.107)
Reformed 1.267 1.346 1.166 1.037 0.969 0.647 0.785 0.873
in 1985 (0.303) (0.247) (0.604) (0.159) (0.177) (0.504) (0.178) (0.581)
Reformed 1.031 1.065 0.836 0.681 0.568 0.559 0.619 0.584
in 1986 (0.112) (0.333) (1.389) (0.455) (0.061) (0.284) (0.152) (0.468)
Reformed 0.868 1.056 0.811 0.764 0.633 0.623 0.553 0.615
in 1987 (0.155) (0.347) (0.574) (1.821) (0.182) (0.102) (0.099) (0.032)
For the states that undertook medical malpractice reforms in
1985, loss ratios continued to increase slightly in 1985, after which
they abated. Over the 1984-91 period, the loss ratio average for these
states declined from 1.27 to 0.87. There was also a 1985 rise in the
mean loss ratios for the states that undertook reforms in 1986 and
1987, eventually leading to a dramatic drop in the loss ratios for those
states.
Similar patterns are evidenced in the median and seventy-fifth
percentile results summarized in Table 7. What is particularly striking
is that over the 1984-86 period, there is a frequent pattern of loss ra-
tios in excess of 2.0, or underwriting losses were more than double the
value of the premiums written. Even with high rates of interest
earned on investments, it is not possible to maintain a profitable in-
surance underwriting effort given these high loss ratios that are perti-
nent at the seventy-fifth percentile of the distribution. For at least
one-fourth of the firms that were the most unprofitable, medical mal-
practice insurance was very much a losing proposition.
In all states there is considerable improvement in the perform-
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ance of medical malpractice insurance after 1987. The starkest im-
provements are evidenced for the low profitability firms at the seventy-
fifth percentile rather than for the mean. Between 1984 and 1991,
the seventy-fifth percentile of the distribution essentially experienced
a doubling of the profitability of insurance, as loss ratios declined to a
level so that losses and premiums were brought into line.
Table 7
State Loss Ratios at the Median and 75th Percentile, 1984-1991
Medical Malpractice
States with no Reform Efforts
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.853 0.930 0.819 0.705 0.655 0.523 0.639 0.576
75th 2.153 1.676 2.272 1.224 1.364 0.923 1.435 1.045
Percentile
States that Reformed in 1985
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.823 1.022 0.802 0.780 0.641 0.614 0.592 0.589
75th 2.284 2.402 2.107 1.369 1.407 1.158 1.065 1.192
Percentile
States that Reformed in 1986
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.770 0.938 0.804 0.700 0.600 0.597 0.562 0.560
75th 2.167 2.163 1.706 1.265 0.987 1.166 1.021 0.986
Percentile
States that Reformed in 1987
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Median 0.689 0.887 0.717 0.680 0.559 0.617 0.555 0.595
75th 1.899 2.217 1.677 1.151 0.850 1.143 0.915 1.024
Percentile
The relationship of these improvements to the adoption of medi-
cal malpractice insurance reforms is more apparent in the compari-
sons undertaken in Table 8. Consider first the performance of the
states that undertook reforms in 1985, as compared with the 1984
baseline insurance performance. Although there are no improve-
ments evident in 1985, perhaps due in part to the continuing surge in
1762 [Vol. 24:1743
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Table 8
Loss Ratio Differences: Medical Malpractice
Reformed in 1985 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1985
1985- 1986- 1987- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991-
Quantile 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
Median 0.199 -0.021 -0.043 -0.182 -0.209 -0.231 -0.234
75th Percentile 0.117 -0.178 -0.915 -0.877 -1.127 -1.219 -1.093
No Reform Efforts
1985- 1986- 1987- 1988- 1989- 1990- 1991-
Quantile 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984 1984
Median 0.077 -0.034 -0.148 -0.198 -0.330 -0.214 -0.277
75th Percentile -0.478 0.119 -0.929 -0.790 -1.231 -0.718 -1.109
Reformed in 1986 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1986
Quantile 1986-1985 1987-1985 1988-1985 1989-1985 1990-1985 1991-1985
Median -0.134 -0.238 -0.338 -0.341 -0.376 -0.378
75th Percentile -0.456 -0.898 -1.176 -0.996 -1.142 -1.176
No Reform Efforts
Quantile 1986-1985 1987-1985 1988-1985 1989-1985 1990-1985 1991-1985
Median -1.154 -0.225 -0.275 -0.408 -0.292 -0.355
75th Percentile 0.596 -0.452 -0.312 -0.753 -0.241 -0.631
Reformed in 1987 vs. No Reform Efforts
Reformed in 1987
Quantile 1987-1986 1988-1986 1989-1986 1990-1986 1991-1986
Median -0.037 -0.158 -0.100 -0.162 -0.122
75th Percentile -0.526 -0.827 -0.534 -0.762 -0.653
No Reform Efforts
Quantile 1987-1986 1988-1986 1989-1986 1990-1986 1991-1986
Median -0.114 -0.164 -0.297 -0.181 -0.244
75th Percentile -1.048 -0.909 -1.350 -0.837 -1.227
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the liability insurance market beginning in 1986 and thereafter, there
is a marked decline in the loss ratios. Overall, the median loss ratio
declined by 0.23 between 1984 and 1991, and there was a decline of
1.093 for the seventy-fifth percentile. These declines are comparable
in magnitude to those that were experienced by the no-reform states.
What differed, however, is that in the no-reform states there is greater
stability and, in the case of the seventy-fifth percentile, more
improvement in 1985 than in the reform states. If the reforms in 1985
were not undertaken at the start of the year, then a more appropriate
baseline starting point would have been 1986. In 1986 and thereafter,
there is a somewhat greater decline in the loss ratios for the reform
states.
In the case of the 1986 reform efforts summarized in Table 8, the
median loss ratio improved by 0.38 for reform states, whereas the
seventy-fifth percentile improved by 1.18. Although the median
improvement is comparable for the reform and the no-reform states,
the seventy-fifth percentile improvement for the reform states is
almost twice as great as for the no-reform states. As in the case of
many of the general liability results, it is the oufliers that appear to be
most affected. Similarly, as in the case of the general liability results,
the 1987 reforms appear to have been least consequential. Indeed,
based on the median and seventy-fifth percentile results in Table 8,
the no-reform states seem to have performed somewhat better than
the 1987 reform states. This pattern may be due in part to a dip in
loss ratio values in the 1987 reform states in 1986, thus establishing a
very low baseline for making any judgements with respect to
improvement. If one looks at the longer term average of, for
example, the mean loss ratios in Table 6, there does appear to be
some evidence of improved profitability in the 1987 reform states,
although it is not as pronounced as for the earlier reform efforts.
V. CONCLUSION
The tort liability reforms for general liability and medical mal-
practice were enacted at the peak of the liability crisis in the mid-
1980s. Very few states failed to enact some kind of reform during
this crisis period. The states' decisions to implement a reform ef-
fort, as well as the timing of the reforms, were not due solely to
interstate political differences and random political factors. There
was a clear-cut relationship between the state's liability insurance
performance and the adoption of liability reform. States in which
losses greatly exceeded premiums, so that liability insurance was
particularly unprofitable, adopted reforms earlier than states
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whose firms had a better record of profitability. The early reform
states also differ quite markedly from the latter reform states and
from the no-reform states in terms of their post-reform
profitability.
To the extent that the objective of the liability reforms was to
enhance insurance profitability, they appear to have succeeded.
Insurance in the reform states became much more profitable in
the post-reform era. Although these effects influence the perform-
ance throughout the market in each state, the high loss firms that
were the most unprofitable seem to have been the most greatly
affected. This incidence of the impact of the liability reforms is
quite consistent with their character, as the various damages cap
provisions should serve to restrict the prevalence of the major loss
outliers that are the source of an unprofitable record of
performance.
Immediately after the reforms were enacted, there is evidence
of substantial improvements in the profitability of both general lia-
bility and medical malpractice insurance. Over a period of time,
however, there appears to have been greater equalization of the
profitability of the insurance written in the different states. This
pattern is not unexpected because in the long run firms should
adjust their underwriting activities to equalize the profitability of
the incremental insurance policy written in different states. Com-
petitive market factors would lead to such a result. From the stand-
point of consumers, this phenomenon suggests that ultimately
many of the gains of the liability reforms will be-passed on to con-
sumers in terms of lower prices. Stabilizing the profitability of in-
surance consequently benefits not only the companies that would
suffer losses because of erratic insurance market performance, but
ultimately may be to the benefit of the purchasers of insurance
who profit from a more stable market.
There is, however, an additional class of parties involved in
these various transactions-those injured by accidents. The stabili-
zation of the insurance market may lead to lower prices for prod-
ucts and for medical care, but will also generally lead to lower
values of tort awards as well. If the social objective was simply to
reduce losses, then that objective could be achieved by abolishing
tort liability altogether. Our societal concerns are clearly much
broader. In the absence of a more detailed assessment of the desir-
ability of the reforms and their effect on injured parties, it would
be premature to conclude that reform efforts that were successful
in enhancing insurance market profitability should be judged a
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success from the standpoint of advancing social welfare. Instead,
any pronouncements of success must be more limited to whether
these efforts accomplished the avowed objectives of the tort reform
efforts.
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